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We believe that the smuggling network that occurred in Esposende was not 
just about an isolated war episode, but a social/economical consequence of the 
German submarine war in the Portuguese shores. According to our investigations and 
historical document analysis, we believe that several Portuguese/Spanish smuggling 
networks flourished, especially alongside the Iberian coast, and traded goods and 
supplies with German submarine crews by taking advantage of the lack of vigilance in 
these coastal areas. We have very good evidences that take us to believe that this 
occurrence could happen all along the Iberian coast, in spite of several difficulties to 
prove considering the lack of documental sources. The Portuguese and Spanish 
historiography mentions this phenomenon, but never went deeper into this subject, 
stating only that were constant rumours and sightings according to the sources of the 
time. In this article the reader can have access to our perspective, and also reflect 
about the German submarine activity around the Iberian coast, particularly the 
Portuguese one.   
1. German Submarine Activity in the Portuguese shores 
It’s not the aim of this article to particularize the activity German submarines 
in the Great War context around the Portuguese coast, but we think that is important 
to mention the characteristics of German operations in this area, as well as some of 
their most important attacks. Portugal entered in the world conflict by many reasons, 
but most of the Portuguese historiography agrees that the capture and confiscation of 
the 72 German ships, at 23 February 1916, that had taken refuge in Portuguese ports 
since the beginning of the war, was the breaking point between German-Portuguese 
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diplomacy
1
. Imperial Germany declared war on Portugal at 9
th
 March 1916 in 
response to this act. The capture of these ships was required by Great Britain, and the 
British proposal was accepted in Belém Palace, Lisbon, on 5
th
 February 1916
2
. Other 
countries like Portugal entered in the conflict in a very similar situation; it’s the case 
of Brazil and Peru that captured German ships in the name of the British strategic 
diplomacy
3
. According to the author Marc Ferro, since the beginning of the conflict, 
about 743 German ships were anchored in neutral waters
4
, 72 of them, according to 
Oliveira Marques
5
, in mainland Portugal and his colonies. By cruising the numbers of 
both authors we can say that 10 % of these ships were actually refuge in Portuguese 
ports, which confirms, in some way, the geographical and strategic importance of the 
Portuguese coast, which converge the following route axis Atlantic-Mediterranean-
Gulf of Biscay. The tonnage of the German ships anchored in Portugal was the double 
of the Portuguese merchant navy before the war that only had 138.000 tons in 
shipping
6
. This fact made the Portuguese and British authorities very interested in the 
capture of these ships, which could provide a significant provision of ships to both 
countries.  
 In the beginning of 1915, German submarine operations expanded to other 
stages of war, including the Mediterranean, the Biscayan Gulf and the Atlantic Ocean, 
which changed the strategy of the Allied navies. In the eyes of the Etente Cordiale 
perspective, Portugal had crucial key points in the Atlantic (Madeira, Azores and 
Cape Verde), which could provide supply bases, and military coordination centres 
down the Atlantic. In 1915, the German admiral Wolfgang Wegener wrote three 
reports about German naval strategy, by suggesting an unrestricted U-boat campaign. 
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In this reports Wegener highlighted the strategic value of the Biscayan Gulf and the 
coastal areas adjacent to Azores and Cape Verde, and proposes that German 
submarines should focus their operations on these same areas
7
. For the German 
admiral, taking Azores and Cape Verde was an unreliable hypothesis, but should be a 
granted acquisition in future peace treaties with the Allies
8
.    
 After Portugal entered on the war, German submarines started to mine Tajo’s 
river mouth, trying to asphyxiate commercial routes from Lisbon port, in the spring of 
1916
9
. Portuguese Navy had no resources to fight German activity, for various 
reasons. The political crisis installed in Portugal, since the falling of the Portuguese 
monarchy, in 1910, was fomented by numerous republican factions that couldn’t 
make a durable administration supported by the parliament. This aspect, alongside the 
economic and financial crisis, wearied out the Portuguese political, economic and 
military institutions, including the Navy. The Navy had only four cruisers, two 
destroyers, and one submarine
10
 and a few more than ten gunboats in reasonable 
conditions to give some struggle to German offensives by this time
11
.  The Navy 
Arsenal
12
 worked very slowly to produce more naval units, considering the fact that 
German ships, captured in Portuguese ports on the 23th February1916, were 
sabotaged by their crews and needed repairs. It was also very difficult to the Navy to 
import new materials from the Allies to repair these ships. So the Portuguese 
Admiralty complemented its numbers by requesting civilian boats
13
 and some of the 
German captured ships in order to raise the Navy’s numbers.  By June 1916, Portugal 
had new units centred especially in Lisbon, some Algarve bases and Leixões port 
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(Oporto), including improvised vapours, gunboats and Tagus river galleons
14
. The 
Navy counted also with six modern German ships, now with Portuguese names.  
 As war went on, Portugal started receiving some aid from the Allies, 
especially with the new balance of power in the Mediterranean when Italy joined the 
Allies, in the middle of 1915
15
. It was the French government that first demonstrated 
some interest in protecting the Portuguese coast, thus ensuring its connections 
Mediterranean and Atlantic seas. In late 1916, France requested, near the Portuguese 
government, the establishment of auxiliary bases on its shore, as will be shown in 
1917, particularly in Leixões, Aveiro and Algarve coast
16
. In September 28, 1917, 
French and the Portuguese military administrations created the Maritime Aviation 
Centre of Lisbon, in Bom Sucesso dock, next to the Belém Tower
17
. The French 
would be responsible for the defense of the port of Leixões (Oporto) and also 
installed, in May 1918, a seaplane base in San Jacinto (near Aveiro) with eight aircraft 
units
18
. With entrance of the US into the conflict, on April 6th 1917, the control of the 
Atlantic became vital, in order to allow the crossing of the American troops to French 
ports. In addition to the French defensive help, Portugal also received American aid in 
the Azores. The American Admiralty, after a dialogue with London, approved the 
installation of a military base in the Azores, in the second half of 1917. In late May 
1917, Americans begin the actual installation of a military base, and subsequently 
deposited around 10,000 tons of coal to supply ships that were crossing the Atlantic 
by this time
19
.  
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2. German Offensives in the Portuguese shores 1916-1918 
At April 17
th
, a German mine sank the Norwegian ship Terje Vikken, near 
Cascais
20
. This mine was dropped by U-73 when on transit to the Mediterranean. She 
was the first ship that sank off the Portuguese coast by German action. But 1916 had 
some more significant German attacks in this area. One of the biggest ships sunk in 
the Great War
21
, the French dreadnought Suffren, displacing 12.750 tons, knew his 
destiny off the Portuguese coast, when on route to France after the Allied offensive in 
the Dardanelles. At 25
th
 November, the U-52 submarine, commanded by Hans 
Walther, torpedoed the ship causing 648 deaths, and had no survivors
22
.  
In December 1916, German submarines attacked Cape Verde and Madeira. 
From the docks of Cattaro, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the U-38, commanded by 
Max Valentiner, attacked Funchal, in Madeira, in 3th December. Probably one of the 
most well documented German attacks in the Portuguese shores, as we can have 
access to Valentiner’s perspective about the same attack in the book La Terreur des 
Mers: Mes Aventures en Sous-Marin 1914-1918
23
. Berlin expected that Max 
Valentiner would find a numerous British fleet in Funchal, but only sunk four ships; 
even so he was given a Pour Le Mérite medal by the Kaiser for this attack
24
. In the 
next day, a submarine was spotted near the S. Vicente port, in Cape Verde. 
Portuguese coastal artillery gave some shots and it was enough to the German 
withdraw
25
. The attack on Funchal confirmed the Allied fears about the U-boat 
growing presence and unpredictability on the Atlantic, has the Entente Cordiale 
admiralties suspected
26
. It was a very serious sign for what was going to occur in the 
Atlantic next year. 
1917, the year of German submarine war zenith, globally speaking, was 
notorious in the Portuguese coast. In this same year, the tonnage of unloaded goods in 
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Portuguese ports represented only 20 % of 1913’s total tonnage27. To have a good 
perspective of the deterioration of Portuguese ports supply lines, we could look to the 
wheat importation. Portugal imported 182.000 tons in 1916 (representing half of the 
intern market consume) and had only access to 55.000 tons in 1917
28
. In 1916, the 
port of Lisbon registered the entry of 2.521 ships (4.298.800 brute tons), that unloaded 
1.336.936 tons in goods, and on the next year only 1.455 ships (1.858.135 brute tons) 
delivered 603.635 tons in this port
29
. In this same year German submarines sunk about 
104 ships on the Portuguese coats, representing 1.467.161 tons approximately
30
. Most 
of them were British and Norwegian ships
31
. Portuguese waters experienced the 
entrance of the U-151 class (ex-Deustchland) in Atlantic naval war stage, increasing 
the operational range of the German operations.  
On March 17
th
 German submarines attacked four Portuguese fishing ships near 
Roca Cape, and according to the journal O Comércio do Porto the attack was 
conducted by two German submarines, one from the north and other from the south. 
This attack left around one hundred men as castaways, which were saved by patrol 
boats from Lisbon
32
. The book The German Pirate – His Methods and Record33 tells 
the experiences of a German crewmember that participated in this attack, with the 
pseudonymous Ajax. In this description Ajax stated that German crews expelled 
Portuguese fishermen from the boats, and sacked the ships by taking fish and cloths 
after threatening them with pistols
34
. This record gives us an idea about how German 
submarine crews obtained fresh goods and supplies in high sea. 
On 24
th
 April, commanding U-35, Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière sunk four 
ships near Sagres, Algarve: the Danish cargo ship Nordsöen
35
, the Norwegian ships 
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Vilhelm Krag and Torvore, and the Italian sailing vessel Bieneimé Prof. Luigi
36
. On 
the same day, U-35 also shared some shots with other ships: the Portuguese trawler 
Galgo
37
; three Spanish cargo ships: La Castreja, Cataluña and Triana
38
; and the 
French ship Caravellas
39
. Portuguese authors like Augusto Salgado, Jorge Russo
40
 
and Paulo Costa (website articles)
41
 developed new studies about this attack, and we 
can actually have a very good perspective about U-35’s activity in this particular day. 
There is also filming records about this occurrence, used to produce the 1917’s 
German propaganda film Der magische Grütel. This singular episode shows that 
German submarines didn’t had opponents in the Portuguese waters, and how 
vulnerable was the Portuguese coast. After this day, Lothar’s ammunition stock was 
very low; and he decided to return to U-35’s base, in the Mediterranean, arriving at 
Cattarro on 6th May 1917
42
.   
On 4 July 1917, the U-155 attacked Ponta Delgada, in the Azores. The 
German submarine action in the Atlantic and Azores was notorious after the entrance 
of United States in the war
43. In attempt to destroy the coal storage in Ponta Delgada’s 
port, as Max Valentiner tried in Funchal on December 3th 1916, Karl Meussel 
bombarded the city and the port facilities. Portuguese coastal artillery simply had no 
range to stop Meussel’s bombardment, but the American cargo ship Orion that was in 
a very good defensive position and fought back. U-155 withdrew a short time after. 
There were no significant damages in the city, and only one little girl died and three 
women were wounded
44
. Locals and the Portuguese authorities celebrated the 
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American Orion crew, including the governor that sent letters to the American consul 
in Portugal, thanking his action
45
. 
More German significant attacks were notorious in the last months of 1917. 
On 2 November, Waldemar Khopamel, commanding U-151, attacked two Brazilian 
cargo ships at S. Vicente port that carried huge coffee cargos
46
. On 12 December, the 
Germans bombarded Funchal again, by Erich Eckelmann aboard U-155. Germans 
made some significant damages in the city, killing five people and wounded several 
civilians
47
. One of the submarine shots damaged Santa Clara church
48
.  
Even dramatic, 1918 showed a softening submarine activity in the Portuguese 
waters, but they continued a privateering war strategy. The effectiveness of the 
convoy system, created by the Allies, was felt, with the reduction of the number of 
casualties at sea. Although the year 1918 shows a significant number of shipwrecks, 
German stopped the attacks on cities or Portuguese military bases in the Atlantic.  
Probably the most significant episode, in 1918, was the combat between the 
armed trawler Augusto de Castilho against Lothar’s von Arnauld de la Perière’s U-
139, on 14 October 1918, not far from Azores
49
. This combat has been the most 
mentioned combat in the Portuguese historiography, and probably one of the most 
documented. In attempt of protecting the passenger ship S. Miguel, the Augusto 
Castilho tried to distract U-139, in a very unfair fight, considering the German 
artillery superiority. The U-155 could simply shoot against the Portuguese trawler out 
of range, with 155 mm deck guns
50
. After a fierce fight the Portuguese trawler 
surrender, soon after the death of the commandant Carvalho Araújo and part of her 
crew. 
                                                          
45
 António José Telo, Os Açores e o Controlo do Atlântico (1898/1948), p.114. 
46
 António José Telo, Primeira República – Do Sonho à Realidade (Lisboa: Artes Gráficas, 2010), 
p.335. 
47
 Saturnino Monteiro, Batalhas e Combates da Marinha Portuguesa. Volume VII – 1808-1975, p.131. 
48
 Rui Cardoso et al., A Primeira Guerra Mundial. Livro Extra sobre a Participação de Portugal, p.77. 
49
 Alberto Cutileiro, O Combate do caça-minas “Augusto de Castilho” com o submarino Alemão”U-
139” visto através do relatório do 1º oficial encarregado de artilharia, capitão-tenente Kurt von Pistor 
(Lisboa: Centro de Estudos de Marinha, 1976), p.9.  
50
 Aniceto Afonso, and Carlos de Matos Gomes, Portugal and the Great War 1915-1917. The Trenches 
(Vila do Conde: Verso da História, 2014), p. 86. 
9 
 
German submarines sunk around 176 ships
51
, either Portuguese and foreign 
ships, representing 1.603.104 tons in shipping, around the Portuguese coast (including 
Madeira, Azores and Cape Verde adjacent waters), and 90,4 % of them sunk in 1917, 
in 1916-1918 period
52
. The most problematic months are visible in Fig.1, were the 
months of January 1917 (with 13 ships recorded sunk), July 1917 (with 17), 
November 1917 (with 13) and March 1918 (with 12). There were some higher 
incidence peaks of submarine warfare, as is visible in the period from December 1916 
to January 1917, or the period from June to September 1917. We note also some 
breaks, as in October 1917, and between April and July 1918. 
 
  
Fig.1. Number of wrecks by months during 1916-1918, caused by German 
submarines in the Portuguese coast. 
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Fig. 1: Wrecks caused by German Submarines in WW1, off the Portuguese Coast 
(1914-1918).  Map made by Oficina do Mapa (Map Workshop), Faculty of Arts of 
Oporto. 
 
3. The Esposende Case: a Portuguese/Spanish Smuggling Network 
To analyse this smuggling case we used several newspapers from that time
53
 in 
order to cross information, but also used information that exists on the Portuguese 
Navy archives. Very few Portuguese authors mention this episode, and it was never 
fully studied in order to obtain a sustained conclusion of this incident. Let’s follow the 
events chronologically. The case is first mentioned on the Portuguese journal O 
Século: 
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“ Esposende: The fiscal police took 9.000 eggs for the german submarines (...) 
These boxes were carried by boats, that during the night escaped to the sea, and with 
the complicity of the Spanish, they were moved to German submarines. It seems that 
the traitors received 600 escudos (Portuguese currency at the time) per shipment. The 
carters that led the eggs to the beach were arrested (...) (Adapted by the author to the 
English language)”54. 
According to this source, the 9.000 eggs came from the town of Barcelos, in 
northern Portugal, and were destined to German submarine crews off the Portuguese 
coast, with the aid of Spanish smugglers that were the intermediaries in this process. 
The same source mentions that the fiscal police from the area arrested this large 
amount of eggs on the beach, as well as the carters that carried them of Esposende 
with the help of some locals. The newspaper also confirms that the Spanish smugglers 
had a very important role by transporting the eggs to the German submarine crews, in 
small barges
55
. Other Portuguese journal Diário de Notícias also confirms this fiscal 
police operation5657. In the same day, the journal Primeiro de Janeiro headlined this 
report: Smuggling for Spain or Supply to the German Submarines?
58
. This journal 
advances with more elements, confirming that the local fiscal police was suspicious 
about a barge from Vila Praia de Âncora (north of Portugal) at some time, but the 
smugglers counted with various spies that protected the smuggling activities near the 
beach
59
. The same source also says that the characteristics of the boxes that carried the 
eggs sustain the idea that the eggs were destined to German submarine crews.  
In 3th May the same journals press new information about the fiscal police 
confiscation. Apparently the smugglers were original from various towns around 
Minho region (North of Portugal)
60
 and they smuggle not just eggs, but also other 
supplies like gasoline, and agricultural products from this region
61
. In second place, 
the carter of the egg boxes that was captured by the local fiscal police had an 
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administrative guide of the mail services of the region, which could provide some 
mobility in the area
62
. These journals arguments that the lack of vigilance on the north 
coast of the Portuguese allowed this kind of smuggling activities. On this same day, 
the local press did not react very well to the accusation made from the greatest 
Portuguese journals of the time. The local journal the Espozendense made very clear 
that this smuggling case was just a simple and regular contraband case that targeted to 
Spain, as it was usual in this region
63
. The local journal stated how difficult was the 
navigation on this coast
64
 and the lack of a powerful lighthouse in Esposende made 
things very difficult to the smugglers to contact with German submarines. Even so, 
this same journal said that Spanish cooperation is a more reliable hypothesis, 
considering the fact that many of Spanish fishermen circulated illegally on this coast, 
without any kind of authorization by the Portuguese authorities
65
.  
On 5
th
 May 1917, the civil governor of Braga, Eduardo Cruz, visited 
Esposende to investigate this controversial case, which is confirmed by various 
Portuguese journals
66
. Eduardo Cerqueira Cruz requested various information’s’ 
within the local fiscal police centre, and concluded that this smuggling network 
cooperated with German submarine crews, and operated between Apúlia and S. 
Bartolomeu do Mar
67
. According to the Portuguese governor this smuggling network 
operated at night, when the local vigilance and visibility were less considerable, and 
admitted the possibility of more kind of networks in the region
68
. Eduardo Cruz wrote 
also a letter to the Interior Minister reporting this smuggling case with German 
submarines
69
. The local press reacted badly once again. The journal editors simply 
didn’t believe in the governor accusation, and stated that the people of Esposende 
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were fighting for Portugal in Flanders, and they weren’t national traitors has many of 
the Portuguese press believed
70
.  
   
Fig.3 Esposende and Cávado River Mouth Fig.4 Location of Esposende 
  
Fig. 5 Map of Esposende in 1913     Fig.6 Smuggling area near Esposende 
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4. The Esposende Case: a Portuguese/Spanish Smuggling Network – 
Analysis and Conclusions 
 Some recent studies made by Portuguese authors believe that this kind of 
interactions on Portuguese and Spanish shores could be frequent, and were the 
consequence of the economic crisis due to the war, as well as German ability to make 
various contacts on the Iberian coast, considering the fact that they did not have port 
facilities in the Atlantic. The Portuguese authors Jorge Russo and Augusto Salgado 
believe that Allied intelligence services, especially the British ones, had strong 
believes that this kind of smuggling networks existed along the Iberian coast
71
. The 
Esposende’s case could be the best-documented case around this theme and could 
change our perspective about the German submarine activity near the Iberian coasts. 
Let’s analyse this one, by cruising it other kind of documentation with appears in the 
journals.  
 Reflecting on the reports and news of the Portuguese journals, we can say that 
the smuggling network in this particular case had various contacts in many northern 
Portuguese towns, and could count with Spanish contacts and transportation units like 
the barges. The network was very well organized by using inland waterways, 
maritime and terrain routes to transport the eggs to Esposende’s beach. The 
Portuguese smugglers were probably small merchant and hoarders who kept 
profitable strategies that explored local markets shortages, and according to one 
report, the eggs were stored in one house, in Gandra, near Esposende
72
. We believe 
that Portuguese smugglers brought the supplies to Spanish contacts off the Portuguese 
coast, and they delivered them to German submarine crews at high sea, somewhat far 
away from the Portuguese coast. But how far? We actually have no documented 
proofs that can provide any kind of answer in this subject. As far as we know, the U-
boat that was nearest to the Portuguese coast was U-52, commanded by Hans Walther, 
as we can see in the navigation chart in the submarine war diary or Kriegstagebuch
73
, 
by 18
th
 to 19
th
 1917. The commander never specified any kind of sea transaction; even 
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so we know that this U-boat made contact with Spanish vessels by this time, like the 
Noya ship, in order to impose the Prize Regulations
74
.  
 
Fig. 7 Hans Walther, Kriegstagebuch – des Kommandos S.MU.U-Boat 
„U.52“. für die Zeit der Vernunternehmung von 16.märz – 27. april 
17.Kapitänleutnant Walther (Hans) ( Cuxhaven-Altenbruch: Deutches Uboat Museum 
Archive, 1917), p. 37. 
 To look at this smuggling network we must also analyse the regional economic 
context and other reasons that stimulated their proliferation. Smuggling agricultural 
products was a constant in Minho’s region, and in all the country, especially alongside 
the Spanish border. As we analysed regional newspapers, the local fiscal police 
confiscated, from several civilians that were selling smuggled corn, cattle, eggs and 
other kind of products
75
. The Great War aggravated the serious economic crisis in 
Portugal, diminishing sea trading routes, which originated an alimentary distribution 
crisis. To combat this crisis, Portuguese municipalities’ administration taxed the food 
prices according to the abundance in the administrative sector, which created an 
imbalance between offer-necessity. Some civilians took advantage of this, by selling 
agriculture products in a better price in other municipalities. According to the 
Portuguese author Alice Samara, Word War One created the perfect conditions to the 
propagation of the hoarders that kept all types of goods stored to sell them later at 
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higher prices
76
. Alice also talks about new black market niches, were hoarders sell 
shortage products at prohibited prices, which made some regional figures very rich
77
. 
Fiscal measures to regulate prices and vigilance around smugglers were just not 
effective at all. Price stipulations were, in a practical meaning, just a theorist measure 
with few little results, considering the lack of local fiscal police effectives. The 
practice of hoarding favoured very specific clienteles, in a relationship that connected 
the smallest farmer to the small retail merchant
78
. Even so the local authorities in 
Esposende tried to react, by prohibiting the exit of caprine and swine cattle beyond the 
municipal frontier, has a report confirms
79
.  
 But what arguments sustain that German submarines traded with this 
smuggling network near Esposende beaches? We believe that are five main reasons. 
In the first place, the visit of the civil governor of Braga, Eduardo Cruz, on May 5
th
, 
was just singular, to say the least, as many Portuguese journals report. If it was just a 
regular smuggling local case, has the local press defended, it would not justify the 
governor’s arrival at the small town of Esposende. The governor confirmed that the 
egg boxes were for German submarine crews off the Portuguese post, considering the 
Spanish intermedium. The governor’s suspicion was sustained in detailed and 
privileged information granted by the local fiscal police that arrested the smugglers 
near Esposende road, and we also have the information that someone wrote a letter to 
the Interior Minister to report the case, as Portuguese journals confirm. According to 
the same sources, Eduardo Cruz propose more fiscal police effectives to raise 
vigilance efficiency along the coast
80
. 
 In second place, the Portuguese smugglers were arrested, condemned and 
judged as suspects for trading with German submarine crews, the enemy, has the 
Navy reports and Portuguese journals confirm
818283
. This aspect is also very singular.  
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Arrested smugglers also had to pay a very significant amount of money to the local 
fiscal police, considering the contact with the enemy. This case was classified as a 
crime.   
 The third aspect it’s probably one the most important elements to analyse in 
this matter. Portuguese Navy departments actually reported the case, and some 
delegates suggest serious measures to prevent this type of occasions. According to a 
particular report from Oporto’s captaincy, delivered to the Navy Ministry84, dated 8th 
October 1917 (6 months after the Esposende case), all Portuguese captaincies were 
ordered to prevent any kind of suspicious landing in to the coast, capturing any 
smuggled goods
85
. In this same report the Department underlines that smuggling cases 
like Esposende were not a big surprise, comprising the economic and social crisis 
provoked by the Great War
86
. Navy representatives visited Esposende to ascertain 
some information about to ships that were sunk in the area, and checked that various 
Spanish civilians were spotted in the area, transporting huge quantities of eggs in to 
ships stationed off the coast
87
. This document sustains press reports about the case, 
and also confirms Spanish presence in transportation operation off the sea: 
 “(…) This service is generously well paid and it’s made very cautiously, and I 
believe that it’s not just a regular smuggling case, but a supply line to German 
submarines that cross that waters (Adaptation to the English language by the author) 
(…)”88 
 This phrase proves that the Spanish smugglers have a very important role on 
this smuggling network, by making contact with German submarines off the coast. 
The writer of the document also reveals serious vigilance problems in the coast, 
declaring that the fiscal police posts are guarded only by two men and the local posts 
have 5 km between each other. He also proposes new sea patrols in the area, as well 
as more fiscal policemen89. Other captaincies reports, from all along the Portuguese 
coast answered to the Portuguese Navy enquiry from Lisbon. Most of them don’t 
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report any kind of smuggling activities near to the coast, in contrast to northern 
captaincies
90
. This proves once more the Portuguese Navy interest in obtaining some 
information about German submarines supply in the Portuguese coast. 
  
 
 
Fig.8 Navy report about the smuggling off the eggs near Esposende.These documents 
prove that the Portuguese navy were aware of the Esposende smuggling case91. 
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Fig.9: These documents mention not just the case of Esposende, but it has some 
reports about similar situations along the Portuguese coast. Some captaincies along 
the Portuguese coast were asked by the navy, if these kind of situations were regular92. 
  
In fourth place, we must look to Esposende territory favourable conditions to 
the flourishment of contraband and smuggling trades, as journal and Navy reported. 
Navigation near Esposende was very dangerous before and during World War One, 
considering the geographical conditions as mentioned before. Various rocks and 
silting areas near Cávado River mouth and beaches complicated ship movements in 
the area, worsened by the lack of a powerful lighthouse. Portuguese journals reported 
plenty of news related to several wrecks that took place near Esposende. It wasn’t 
only in Esposende area that was dangerous to the ship sailing in the zone, but all along 
the north coast of Portugal. Sources of the time mention an authentic “death corridor” 
in this area. As you can see in Fig. 11 between the Montedor (near Viana do Castelo) 
and Luz (Oporto) lighthouses there wasn’t any reliable light system, as we can 
confirm in this report: 
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 “ (…) The captains of the ships that often attend our port (Leixões, Oporto, 
Portugal) have complained many times that the northern coast of Portugal has 
insufficient light, considering the improvements that were been made. They think that 
putting a lighthouse in Fão or Esposende would allow ships to always have access to 
light, which does not happen now, because there are places where no one can see nor 
Montedor lighthouse nor Luz lighthouse (...) (Adapted to the English language by the 
author)”93. 
 Local elites requested many times, before and during the war, the construction 
of new infrastructures in this territory, like a powerful lighthouse or any kind of 
sonorous signal, as various news report in the journal O Comércio do Porto94. This 
area could encourage the proliferation of smuggling activities, considering the fact 
that most activities of this kind were made at night, as local administration confirm. 
To make things worse, to make things worse, in 1917 the lighthouse of Montedor was 
seriously damaged by a storm, which aggravated the light system in this particular 
area
95
. 
The five reason consider Spanish neutral policy towards Germany in the Great 
War, which provided some “non-official” support to German submarines. Some 
Portuguese and Spanish authors consider that German submarines supplied in Spain, 
to operate not only in the Atlantic, but also in the Mediterranean. Spanish author 
Jaime Rubio Rosales defends that, during the Great War, an intense German 
submarine activity was notorious around Canary Islands, according to a local 
witnesses in La Gomera
96
. The Portuguese author Jaime Correia do Inso stated that 
German submarines that operated in Algarve coast, were supplied between Huelva 
and Cadiz, and the ones that operated in the Portuguese northern coast were supplied 
in the Galician port of Vigo
97
. Correia do Inso the also states that German presence in 
Canary Islands was constant
98
. 
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We have no doubts that German submarines used Spain as a logistical 
platform to coordinate attack and had established supply lines, before attacking the 
Portuguese coast. Spanish coast contraband lines, according to captured German Navy 
Intelligence reports, had established spies in many coastal points, and organized small 
boats flotillas with local crews to attend submarine necessities
99. It didn’t took long 
for the Allies to notice that German submarines operated from Spanish ports, and 
pressed diplomatically Madrid after some polemic incidents. In May 1915, Allied 
delegacies denounced, to the Spanish government, the existence of German submarine 
gas posts, on the ports of Biurrún (Basque coast), Alsasua (Basque coast) and 
Villareal (near Valencia). This issue took Spanish minister, José Sánchez Guerra, to 
communicate with Oviedo, Granada, Huelva, Pontevedra, Castellón Seville, Coruna 
and Navarra to discover these kind of posts
100
. In September 1915, French press 
denounce various rumours around submarine supply in Spanish shores, including their 
Africans possessions
101
. In the summer of 1916, Italian government presented their 
suspects, arguing that Spanish vessels supplied German submarines in the Oriental 
Mediterranean
102
. There were some mediatic cases in this subject, taking for example 
the U-35 supply to the German refuge ship SS Roma in Cartagena port, which 
provoked French and British ambassadors to protest vilely in Madrid, asserting that 
the U-boat in question provisioned the SS Roma ship during his military activity
103
.  
 But how Spanish smugglers contacted with German submarine crews in the 
Portuguese coast? We can actually not response with total assurance. Eduardo 
González Calleja defends that we must look to the smuggling tradition between 
Spanish Galicia and the north of Portugal. These territories were not attractive to the 
German intelligence services because of the lack of good communication systems, but 
offered coastal enclaves very suited to German submarine supply
104
. Eduardo Calleja 
affirms that German espionage services established more easily near Cádiz and 
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Canary Islands, considering the difficult in place bases in the Mediterranean
105
. Our 
historical analysis provided some reports in this matter, for example the U-38 before 
attacking Funchal, in Madeira, at 3th December 1916, supplied in Canary Islands
106
. 
The same source, based in an intelligence information of Cape Verde authorities, 
reports that one vessel was saw alongside a German submarine, loading gas
107
. This 
particular information could give us a very interesting picture about the smuggling 
case in Esposende. It’s very likely that vessels and German submarines traded goods 
at the high sea, and we think that were a very common practice between German 
submarine crews. These reports sustain once more that aspect. Spanish intermediaries 
contacted Portuguese producers and smugglers, and then they established contact with 
German submarine crews at high sea, not too close to the Portuguese shore. But how 
far from the coast? As far as we can prove, German submarines didn’t get very close 
from the shore, except some U-boats taking Max Valentiner’s U-38108, and Lothar 
von Arnauld de la Perière’s U-35109.  
 
 
 
                                                          
105
Eduardo González Calleja, El Dispositivo de Vigilancia Francés en Galicia durante la Primeira 
Guerra Mundial, p.7. 
106
 O Comércio do Porto (Porto) December 6, 1916, p.3. 
107
 Ibid. 
108
 After attacking Funchal, on 3 December, Max Valentiner anchored very close to Vila Baleira, in 
Porto Santo island, in Madeira archipelago.  
109
 At 24
th
 April, Perière’s U-35 was very close to the Portuguese shore in Algarve, especially when 
destroyed the Danish ship Nordsöen , near Sagres. 
23 
 
 
Fig.10. Map of Esposende, 1913. 
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Fig.11. North of Portugal lighthouse system, only Montedor (Viana do Castelo) and 
Luz lighthouses (Oporto) could provide a reasonable aid to navigators.  
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